University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1991

The Fourth Amendment: The Right of the People to Be Secure in
Their Persons, Homes, Papers, and Effects
Yale Kamisar

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/259

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Kamisar, Yale. "The Fourth Amendment: The Right of the People to Be Secure in Their Persons, Homes,
Papers, and Effects." In A Time for Choices, edited by C. A. Haskel and J. H. Otto. Denver: Univ. of
Colorado, Graduate School of Public Affairs 1991.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A

TIME
for

CHOICES
Edited by
Claudia A. Haskel

and
Jean H. Otto

The views expressed in this publicacion do not necessarily reflect the views of the officers, board of trustees, staff,
organizational or individual members of the FIRST AMENDMENT CoKGRESS. Readers with differing opinions are
invited to submit papers to the FIRST AMENDMENT CONGRESS headquarters ln Denver) Colorado. Whenever possible, those papers will be distributed to delegates at regional and national cong,esses.

Copyright© 1991 by FIRST AMENDMENT CONGRESS

ISBN 0-9628774-0-9

This publication is designed so that the papers may be easily reproduced at the instance and inspiration of the
reader. Reproduced copies may be used for commercial purposes only with written c_onsent from the FIRST
AMENDMENT CONGRESS. Whenever material from this publication is reproduced, please cite the FIRST A\tlENDMENT CONGRESS, the author of the paper and A Time for Choices as the source.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT

Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

VI

I

AMENDMENT

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.

II

AMENDMENT

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.

I II

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed;
which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT

VI I

In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Collrt of the United States,
than according to the rufes__ of cominon law.

AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT

Iv

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

VI II

AMENDMENT

Ix

The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a ·Grand Jurj,
except in cases arising in the land or qaval forces, or
in rhe Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw;
nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.

V

AMENDMENT

The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.

X
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The Fourth Amendment:

The Right of the People
to Be Secure in Their Persons, Homes,
Papers, and Effects
By YALE

T
Yale Kamisar, the
Henry K. Ransom
Professor ot Law at the
University of Michigan,
is a leading
commentator on
constitutional law and
criminal procedure.

KAMISAR

HREE QUARTERS OF A CENTURY ago, the Supreme Court expressed
some thoughts on constitutional interpretation that bear repeating today
(Weems v. United States):

Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is particularly true of constitution~ .... [In interpreting] a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of wh:n has been but what may be. Under any
other rule a constitution would indeed be as eas}\of application as it would be deficient in
efficacy and power.

The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, homes, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" and bans the issuance of warrants except upon "probable cause" and certain other conditions. The wording of the amendment is succinct and majestic.
But it is also vague and general. Thus, whether, and how, to apply it to new conditions has generated great controversy-and none greater than the current agitation over mass drug testing.

Electronic
Surveillance

Until recently, the best illustration of the struggle to adapt the search and
seizure provision to new developments was the Court's confrontation with the
troublesome problem of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. In Olmstead
v. United States ( 1928), the first wiretapping case to reach the Supreme Court, a
5-4 majority, per Chief Justice Taft, concluded, over the famous dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis, that so long as electronic surveillance did not involve a
physical entry into one's home or office it fell outside the coverage of the Fourth
Amendment. Conversations, reasoned Taft, were not "things" to be "seized"
within the meaning of the amendment.
In the following years, as parabolic microphones and other forms of sophisticated electronic snooping made their presence felt, it became increasingly clear
that the property-trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment could not survive.
The Warren Court finally rejected it in the 1967 Katz case. The Fourth Amendment, the Court told us, "protects people, not places"; the amendment applies
whenever the government violates a person's "justifiable" expectation of privacy or
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
Portions ofthis paper copyright© 1987 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permiision.
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But that was not the end of the matter. Once tapping and bugging were
deemed "searches" or "seizures," were they so inherently intrusive and indiscriminate that they were necessarily unreasonable ones? The Court answered in the negative. If the Taft Court had read the Fourth Amendment too literally, to maintain
that conversations were beyond the reach of any warrant or court order would be
to display little more sophistication.

: :11
'1,,

Privacy and
Random Drug
Testing

Today it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court struggled so long and so
hard to bring electronic surveillance within the ambit and the terms of the Fourth
Amendment. For the constitutional problems posed by such surveillance,
although not inconsiderable, pale in comparison with those raised by mass or
random drug testing. Indeed, some day, we may look back on such testing as
either the most dramatic illustration of the application of the Fourth Amendment
to new conditions and purposes or the most striking example of the failure to do
so.
In 1986, President Reagan issued an execurive order calling for a "drug-free
federal workplace," an order requiring each executive agency to set up a program
to test all job applicants and current employees in "sensitive positions." A growing
number of state and local agencies have also instituted urinalysis screening. (So
have many of the largest private employees, bm they need not satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements because the Amendmeqt only restricts government
officials. However, government involvement in private conduct may make that
conduct "state action.")

These developments have put enormous pressure on the Fourth Amendment. Very few people (and perhaps not too many judges) will worry about losses
of privacy when the government claims that such losses are "necessary'' in order to
win "the war against drugs."
Questions have been raised about the need for, and the accuracy of, mass
drug testing. But even if the courts are convinced that mandatory warrantless and
suspicionless testing is an effective means of achieving an important public objective, effectiveness alone is not a sufficient justification for a legal search. As one
federal judge recently noted: "There is no doubt about it~searches and seizures
can yield a wealth of information useful to the searchers. (That is why King
George Ill's men so frequently searched the Colonists.) That potential, however,
does not make [a governmental search] a constitutionally reasonable one."
In 1989, the constirutionality of drug testing finally reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. That year, in companion cases, ,National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab (5-4) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association (7-2),
the Court upheld the constitutionality of two drug-testing programs that predated the president's executive order.
The contention that state-mandated urinalysis is neither a "search" or
"seizure" because it does not entail a physical invasion, or even a touching, of the
body might have prevailed in the Taft Court era, but it was quickly dismissed,
and rightly so, by the current Supreme Court: Urinalysis is covered by the Fourth
Amendment because one has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in
the personal information contained in one's bodily fluids. Moreover, a urine test
will often be conducted under the close surveillance of a government representaA Time for Choices
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rive, an embarrassing, if not a humiliating, experience.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the challenges to each testing program. But
the Skinner and Von Raab cases are hardly the last word on the subject. Because
the drug-testing plans at issue in each case were heavily circumscribed, rhe fate of
other programs less restricted in scope is unclear. The principles lurking in this
area will have to await shaping and clarification in future cases.
At issue in the Skinner case were federal regulations requiring railroad
employees involved in train accidents to submit to alcohol and drug tests and permitring railroads to administer breath or urine tests to employees who violated
certain safety rules. Von Raab, the companion case, dealt with provisions of a customs service plan that required drug testing of employees who sought transfer or
promotion to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or
that require the carrying of firearms.
In upholding both programs, although neither required a warrant nor any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the Court, speaking through newly
appointed Justice Anthony Kennedy, utilized a general "reasonableness" test or a
general "balancing" approach. Because neither program was designed to serve
ordinary law enforcement needs (or, to put it somewhat differently, each program
presented special governmental needs beyol:l:d the normal needs of law enforcement), the Court deemed departure from thhusual Fourth Amendment requirements justified and a general balancing of individual privacy expectations against
the government's interests appropriate.
That the government's interests prevailed in both cases-the Court concluded that traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards were "impractical" in these
settings-is hardly surprising. This is usually the result when the Court utilizes
what the dissenters aptly called "a formless and unguided 'reasonableness' balancing inquiry."
Von Raab is the more significant, and more troublesome, case of the two.
Although it can be read narrowly (if one strains a bit) it also can be read broadly
as resting on nothing more than the government's abstract interest in the
"integrity and judgment" of its employees. (Of 3,600 Customs Service employees
tested, only five tested positive for drugs; the commissioner of customs himself
had stated that the service was largely drug-free.) Moreover, unlike the program
sustained in Skinner, the Customs Service testing plan did not require predicate
circumstances that at least raise some suspicion about the government employees
to be tested.
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the majority in Skinner, but dissented in Von
Raab. There is much force in his argument that the only plausible explanation for
the Customs Service drug-testing program was "symbolism"-to show that the
service is "clean" and rhat the government is serious about its war on drugs. As
Justice Scalia emphasized, however, "the impairment of individual liberties cannot
be the means of making a point"; "symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a
cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search."
After reading the opinion of the Court in Von Raab, one cannot help but
ask: What happened to the Fourth Amendment? In light of the text and history
of the amendment, how can the Court sustain searches conducted without a war1
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rant and in che absence of "probable cause"-indeed, in the absence of any level
of individualized suspicion? If drug testing is a "search" (and the Court was quick
to recognize that it is) and if individuals do not lose their Fourth Amendment
rights merely because they work for the government (and the Court has assured us
that they do not), how can any public employee be tested without any suspicion
particular to him simply because he is a member of a group that includes some
who do use drugs? After all, no court ever has, or would, approve a "dragnet" or
"blanket" search of all people in a particular neighborhood, even one in a high
crime neighborhood, on the rationale that such a police operation would turn up
evidence of criminal conduct on the part of some people-as undoubtedly it
would.
But the matter is more complicated than that. Although the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed these questions, the lower federal courts have consistently upheld what might be called "dragnet searches" of boarding passengers and
their carry-on luggage at airport gates, and what might be characterized as "blanket" metal detector searches and inspections of briefcases and parcels at the doors
of courthouses and other governmental buildings. Moreover, a year after the drugtesting cases, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court upheld a
sobriety checkpoint operation, whereby po1ice stationed at a DWI roadblock
stopped every approaching vehicle. How can \hese "mass, suspicionless investigations" be squared with the Fourth Amendment?',,
·
The answer is that in the last quarter-century the Court has viewed the
Fourth Amendment as a flexible standard that permits fairly wide-open balancing
of public and individual interests when government programs are directed at special problems unlike those confronted by the police in their day-to-day pursuit of
criminals. In these instances (originally inspection of residential and commercial
buildings for possible violations of health, safety and sanitation standards) the
Court has carved out an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment constraints
for what have been variously called "inspections," "regulatory searches" or
"administrative searches." The essence of this exception is that searches not conducted as a part of a typical police investigation to secure evidence of crime but as
part of a general regulatory scheme (one applying standardized procedures negating the potential for arbitrariness) need not be based on individualized suspicion
or, sometimes, be authorized by warrants.

The
Administrative
Search Concept

It should not be forgotten, however, that the "administrative search" exception to traditional search and seizure safeguarc\s was, at its inception, a narrow
one. Most housing code violations occur within private premises and cannot be
detected from the outside. Thus, if housing code violations required individualized suspicion, such inspections might not be possible at all. Moreover, unlike
drug testing, housing code inspections, as the Court emphasized at the time, were
not "personal in nature" because they focused on heating, plumbing and wiring
rather than on evidence of the occupant's activities.
Airport and courthouse searches also can be justified as "administrative
searches," but these precedents, too, can be read narrowly. Courthouse searches
were a response to the bombing of government buildings; airport searches were a
response to a dramatic escalation of skyjacking and air piracy-crimes which
A Time for Choices
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exceed all others in terms of the potential for enormous and immediate harm.
Moreover, airport searches present the government with a "now-or-never
opportunity"-the individual passing the checkpoint is in but momentary contact
with the government and thus even a reasonable suspicion requirement would be
unworkable. This, of course, is not so as to the ongoing supervision of government employees. Finally, a metal detector search constitutes a minimal intrusion,
certainly a much more limited one than the forced discharge of bodily fluids.
This is why, as a general proposition, on-the-job random drug testing should
not be imposed absent a clear showing that a process of close supervision of
employees plus testing upon some particularized suspicion (a less demanding
standard than "probable cause") produces unacceptable results.
The serviceability of the administrative search concept has gladdened government lawyers, but has alarmed others, including me. "Administrative search" is
swarming around the Fourth Amendment like bees. And the drone may soon
become deafening.
I agree with the University of Illinois' Wayne Lafave, author of the leading
treatise on search and seizure, who recently told me: "Unless the administrative
search is limited to truly extraordinary simations where rigorous application of
typical Fourth Amendment standards woul.d be intolerable, would lead to unacceptably poor results, the amendment-as W,e thought we knew it-will largely
disappear. The need to detect drug users is iriirortant, ,but hardly more so than
the need to search for narcotics dealers, kidnappers and murderers. Yet we have
never demanded 100 percent enforcement of the criminal law, or anything
approaching it. Instead, we are committed to a philosophy of tolerating a certain
level of undetected crime as preferable to an oppressive state."
As indicated earlier, because the particular testing program upheld in Von
Raab was heavily circumscribed, the case can be read narrowly. But I think such a
reading would be an unrealistic one. Von Raab probably means at least this much:
Concerns about public safety are sufficiently compelling to justify warranrless, suspicion less drug testing of various categories of law enforcement and corrections
officers and also certain categories of other public employees whose impaired faculties would pose a clear and present danger to the public safety of co-workers or
the general public.
Such an approach carries a considerable distance, but at least it has a stopping point. I do not believe the same can be said for the argument-one made by
the government in Von Raab and in a goodly number of other cases-that the
need to maintain the "integrity'' and the "public image" of various government
agencies and their employees also justifies suspicion less drug testing.
If such an argument prevails-if mass, random drug testing may rest simply
on the premise that government employees serve as "role models"-the liberty
and privacy of millions of federal, state and city workers, regardless of the nature
of their jobs, will be significantly diminished. Nor is that all. What about lawyers,
doctors and accountants? Aren't we all role models?
Judge (later Supreme Court Justice) Benjamin Cardozo once observed that
"the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn judges by."
The drug-testing cases illustrate his point. The danger today is that judges will be
unduly influenced by contemporary tides and currents-so much so that these
A Time for Choices ~~
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forces may engulf the Fourth Amendment itself.
The "individualized suspicion" concept is the heart of the Fourth Amendment. However great the threat posed by illicit drug use, that concept must be
preserved. It must remain the rule, not the exception.
The Von Raab majority spoke of "a national crisis in law enforcement"
caused by the drug problem. But we should greet claims of "crisis" or "emergency"
or "necessity" with considerable skepticism. For such slogans can be-and have
been-a free people's most effective tranquilizers. As we mark the 200th anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, we would do well to remember that.1'

Discussion:
In general the Fourth Amendment requires that the government obtain a warrant
before it conducts searches, and warrants are usually issued only if there is some
specific reason to suspect wrongdoing. Yale Kamisar shows how the Supreme CoLrt
has adapted these protections to modern life by defining "searches" to include wiretapping and other invasions of privacy. The courts, however, have also allowed searches
without any "individualized suspicion" in certain non-criminal settings, such as housing
inspections. Recently, this "administrative search" exception has been extended to
permit suspicionlass drug testing of railroad employees and federal drug agents. Professor Kamisar sees this development as having fundamental importance; indeed, he
fears that unless this trend is reversed, the Fourth Amendmen.t as we know it "will
largely disappear."
\,

•

Why are the drug-testing cases so ominous? Professor Kamisar emphasizes several considerations. The Court has increasingly employed a general balancing test,
which is vague and provides little support for restricting the government's power to
search when (as is nearly always the case) important information might be discovered.
Moreover, the Court may have accepted the idea that the government's interest in the
symbolism of having a drug-free workforce is sufficiently important to justify random
testing. Since we are all potentially "role models," this justification would permit random
testing of virtual1y all government employees, indeed all members of the legal and
medical professions. Finally, a crisis-mentality about narcotic use further diminishes the
incentives for preserving the older, more protective understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.
As you read this essay, ask yourself whether you should be frightened by the legal
developments that are described. It does not seem all that threatening for the government to require that its drug agents and those who are responsible for railroad safety
be drug-free. However, it is true that in a sense we are all role models, so that the principle in those cases could readily be extended. But if drug testing is as intrusive and
humiliating as Professor Kamisar suggests, how I kely is it that such testing would be
imposed on virtually everyone? The public has acqui~sced to some kinds of random
searches that are very widely imposed-for example, sobriety checkpoints and airport
metal detection. Do these suggest that Professor Kamisar's fears of universal drug testing might be realistic? If so, do they suggest that the result would be deeply destructive
to Fourth Amendment values?
In at least one respect, random drug testirg of government employees is less
hostile to Fourth Amendment values than are sobriety roadblocks and airport screening. Drug testing as a condition of employment is done to find qualified employees, not
to enforce the criminal laws. In this respect, drug testing is simply one of many invasions of privacy-like aptitude testing, physical examinations, and the taking of personal histories-that can accompany employment decisions. Is urine testing more or
less a "search" than these kinds of inquiries? Should individualized suspicion be
required before some or all of these intrusions are permitted?
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